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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF' FACTS
Contrary to appellants' representation that they
own the fee title to Lot 8, Block 1 North, Beyles Riverside Plot, they own fee title to an undivided one-half
interest only.
The Warranty Deed at p. 78 of the Abstract to
the property (Ex. P. 5) dated Sept. 15, 1930, conveys
1

Lot 8 to A. V. and Patricia G. Raplee as tenants in 1
common. The affidavit of Patricia G. Raplee at R. 35.
discloses that A. V. Raplee is deceased. There is no
evidence whether he left a will or who his heirs are.
Appellants' claim to title to Lot 8 consists of a deed
they acquired for $50.00 from Patricia G. Rap lee dated
May 3, 1965, recorded May 6, 1965 (Ex. P-3) and
a deed they acquired for $50.00 dated May 10, 1965, ·
recorded May 12, 1965 (Ex. P-4) from Robert G.
Raplee, who describes himself as the only child of 1
Patricia G. Raplee and the late A. V. Raplee. The :
record is also silent as to how many times A. V. Raplee I
was married or what children he may have had from r
i
other wives. Appellants failed to prove that they ac- '
quired the undivided one-half interest of A. V. Raplee )
to Lot 8 as a tenant in common.
'
Respondents claim ownership thru Ex. D-1,
1
Auditor's Tax Deed, dated Feb. 28, 1939, conveying
Lot 8 to Salt Lake County upon failure of owners tc
redeem Lot 8 for four years after the tax sale made i
Jan. 10, 1935 for unpaid 1934 taxes, together with I
Ex. D-2, Salt Lake County Deed to respondents dated i
June 15, 1965, of Lot 8, for $400.00 tendered to Salt
Lake County on April 28, 1965, (T-107 and Ex. ,
D-10) with respondents' offer to purchase Lot 8 from
the County.
Mrs. Raplee's affidavit dated June 2, 1966 (R-35)
was received in evidence per Stipulation of the parties
shown at R. 45. Mrs. Raplee's affidavit states:
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"3. That neither my deceased husband during
his life, nor I during my lifetime, or anyone acting for us or on our behalf, ever went upon the
aforesaid real property (Lot 8) or took possession or occupancy of it from and after the time
we purchased it from W. R. Roberts and Lulu
Roberts, his wife, on Sept. 15, 1930.
4. Neither of us . . . paid any of the taxes
... except for the first few years. So far as my
deceased husband and I were concerned, we
abandoned the property more than 30 years ago."

On May 12, 1965, after appellants had recorded
the last of the two deeds received from Mrs. Raplee and
her son, and until they filed this action on June 1, 1965,
appellants went to Lot 8, looked at it and measured
it with a tape. They went back to the property a second
time to see if there were any trucks parked on it. (T-71,
72). ]/fr. Layton testified (T. 92) that appellant claimed
no right or interest in Lot 8 prior to May 12, 1965.
Thereafter and up to the time of the filing of this action,
Mr. Layton admitted he didn't occupy the land. 'Ve
quote from T -93:

Q. And other than what you did the first time

vou went down, you did nothing between May
i2, '55 and June 1, '65, except file your suit
in this matter. 'Vould that be a correct statement
of fact?
A. As far as occupying the land?

Q. Yes.
A. No, I didn't occupy the land.

3

The court found that the appellants and their
predecessors failed to actually occupy or be in possession
of the property for mo~e than 30 years last past, which
30 years encompasses the four years prior to the commencement of their action, and appellants were therefore found barred under the provisions of Sections
78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3 and 78-12-7.1, UCA 1953
as amended (R. 52, 53).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. Appellants' action is barred by the statute of

limitations, 78-12-5.l and 78-12-5.2.
2. Appellants' action is barred by the adverse possession statute 78-12-7.l.
3. Respondents have proved title and are entitled
to the decree which quieted their title against appellants. \
I

ARGUMENT
RESPONDENTS HA VE A TAX TITLE
VALID AGAINST APPELLANTS' TITLE.
Salt Lake County acquired a tax title by Auditor's
Tax Deed dated Feb. 28, 1939 (D-1) and respondents
succeeded to it by Salt Lake County Deed dated
June 15, 1965, (D-2) pursuant to a $400.00 tender and
offer to purchase submitted to Salt Lake County April
28, 1965, (T-107), which offer was accepted at the Salt
Lake County Commission meeting June 4, 1905. (T·
108). Appellants owned Lots l thru 6. Respondents
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outbid them and acquired Lot 7 in early April, 1965
at a probate sale, offered to purchase Lot 8 from the
County on April 28, 1965, and acquired Lot 9 from
dealings with a private party which culminated on l\Iay
11, 1965. Respondents, after acquiring Lot 7 and prior
to .May 1, 1965, had Lots 7, 8 and 9 surveyed and
marker pegs installed prior to June 1, 1965, ( T-111),
which pegs were visible to appellants when they went
upon the property after :May 12, 1965 ( T-'73). Respondents contend appellants had not advised them
of their interest in or purchase of Lot 8 at any time
prior to respondents' purchase of it on June 4, 1965,
or they wouldn't have thrown away their $400.00 ( T112, 113, 114, 115).
Appellants contend that the tax title is invalid in
that the 1934 assessment roll contained no Auditor's
Affidavit attached to it as required by Section 58-8-7
UCA 1953. However, Section 78-12-5.3 UCA 1953
defines "tax title" in such a way as to render immaterial
the technical defects in tax sales that have heretofore
voided the validity of tax titles, whereby respondents'
tax title, even if invalid, is perfected if the owners
are barred from maintaining an action against the tax
title by virtue of the statutes of limitation, Sections
78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, UCA 1953 as amended. So
this Court decided in Hansen v. Morris, 3 Ut.2d 310,
283 P2 884.
Appellants cite Thomas v. Braffets Heirs, 6 Utah
2d 57, 305 P2 507, as authority that the missing Audi-
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tor's Affidavit renders the instant tax title void. However, that case is not in point, as the Court there held
that the defense of the owners of the land was not
barred by the statutes of limitation aforesaid and the
owners could therefore properly raise the invalidity
of the tax title in their defense to it.
Introduction of the tax title, D-1, was sufficient
under Section 78-12-5.3 UCA 1953 as amended to show
prima facie valid tax title in respondents. See Hansen
v. Morris supra.
Appellants cite Lyman v. Natl. Mtge. Bond Corp.,
7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P2 322, that the tax title should
fail even where the owners have not been in possession
or occupancy. The court there held in favor of the
owners because the tax owner had failed to pay all the
taxes levied or assessed upon the property within four '
years prior to the commencent of the action. The Court
held that the tax title owners had failed to establish
any valid claim to the property because the adverse
possession statute, 78-12-7.1 UCA 1953 barred them,
under the last three lines thereof, because of their failure
to pay all taxes on time for the required period of years
therein set forth.
The instant case is not covered by the Lyman
decision, for in this case, all taxes levied or assessed upon
the property since the inception of the tax title in 1939
have been timely met. Further, respondents can preyail
over appellants on the theory of adverse possessors,
even if appellants were not barred by the statutes of
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limitation, as respondents meet the remaining requirements of 78-12-7.l to qualify as adverse possessors
under a tax title. Appellants in their brief attempt to
show that the Raplees had the constructive possession
of the land because they were the legal owners and that
the County did not become the owner in 1939 because
of the alleged defect of the missing Auditor's affidavit
on the assessment roll.
However, the presumption that the legal owner
of the title is in possession of the land, cited in the
general law and cases in pp. 15-18 of appellant's brief,
is only a prima facie presumption. It falls in the face
of the rebutting evidence presented by Mrs. Raplee's
affidavit (R-35) in which she states that not only did
they never take possession or go into any occupancy
of the land - they had abandoned the property more
than 30 years ago. Abandonment is inconsistent with
possession or any constructive possession, and the presumption fails. Section 78-12-5.l states that no action
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his
predecessor has act1ially occupied or been in possession
of such property within four years prior to the commencement of the action. Section 78-12-5.2 uses the
hnguage, " ... has actually occ1ipied or been in actual
possession, . . . " 'Vhen l\-1rs. Raplee states on :May 3,
HH.l5, that the legal owners abandoned the property
7

more than 30 years ago, or prior to May 3, 1935, how
can appellants now contend that they, thru their
( Raplee) predecessors, had constructive or any kind
of possession? The prima facie presumption that the
County, as legal owner since 1939 under the tax title,
was in possession, remained unrebutted. The court
found that appellants' acts between May 12 and June
1, 1965, did not constitute actually occupying or being
in possession of the property. Furthermore, the dictum
in Peterson v. Callister, 6 Ut. 2d 359, 313 P2d 814,
indicates that appellants' efforts, even if successful,
would have been a couple of decades too late.
The dictum in Peterson v. Callister, supra, antici·
pates, analyzes and capsules this case exactly as it was
decided in the lower court, based on the court's inter·
pretation of Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, which :
are substantially similar and are our statutes of limi,
tation concern tax titles.
1

78-12-5.1 says
" ... with respect to actions or defenses ...
against the holder of a tax title ... no such action
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more
than four years after the date of the tax deed
... unless the person commencing or interposing
such action or defense ... has actually occupied
or been in possession ... within four years prior
to the commencement or interposition of such
action or defense .
" (Italics ours) .
78-12-5.2 says:

"No action or defense ... shall be commenced
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or interposed against the holder of a tax title
after the expiration of four years from the date
of the ... tax title. This section shall not bar any
action or defense by the owner of the legal title
... where he ... has actually occupied ... such
property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or defense."
Both statutes interdict commencement of action
or interposition of defense more than four years after
the date of the tax title. Both statutes clearly state this.
They then go on to identify who is permitted to commence such an action or interpose such a defense ( during such four year period) as being a person who was
in actual possession of the property within four years
prior to such action or defense. Both statutes define
and limit such action to an action (or defense) commenced or interposed within four years after the date
of the tax title.
In other words, if the tax title arose Jan. 1, 1960,
suit is required to be commenced or defense interposed,
within four year thereafter, or prior to Jan. 1, 1964,
and then only by a person who was in actual possession
within four years prior to not later than Jan. l, 1964,
the last date on which such suit could commence or
defense be interposed.
Peterson v. Callister, supra, clearly so states. It
says that a person cannot defeat the tax title by showing
that he was in possession within four years prior to the
commencement of any action that might be brought,
as appellants insist in the instant case. Appellants
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wish this court to rely on the last half of the above two
statutes and ignore the first half. The first half is a
limitation on the last half of each statute and require~
appellants to be in possession of the land within four
years prior to the commencement of an action which
had to be commenced or def ended within four years
after the tax title arose. The Court so held in Hansen
v. Morris, supra.
As stated in Peterson v. Callister!
"To read the last part of the statute literally
and not in context with the entire statute would
defeat the purpose of the statue, which is to put
tax titles to rest after four years; that if a tax
title holder brought a quiet title action 25 years
after he acquired his tax title, someone in pos·
session within four years of the commencement
of this action could defeat the tax title holder,
and that is not the intention or purport of the 1
statutes in question."
1

The implications in Pender v. Alix, 11 U2 58,
354 P2 1066, support the foregoing reasoning.
Brown acquired a tax deed from Salt Lake County
in Sept., 1942. Pender brought a quiet title suit in
1947 and joined Salt Lake County as defendant but
not Brown. Brown learned of the action and joined in
1959 as intervenor, asserting his tax title and continu·
ous occupancy and payment of taxes since 1942. The
court granted Brown's motion for summary judgment,
and Pender appealed. In affirming the summary ju<lg·
ment, our Supreme Court said Pender asserted neither
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payment of taxes or occupancy during or after the four
years ensuing after Brown obtained the tax deed.

If there could be an implication that the court
might have ruled otherwise if Pender had proved occupancy "after the four years ensuing after Brown obtained the tax deed", such implication is squarely against
the language in the Peterson vs. Callister case, which
the Supreme Court expressly cited and reaffirmed in
the Pender case.
CONCLUSION
.t
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In conclusion, we repeat that this case has been
resolved in favor of respondents by the dictum in Peterson v. Callister, which analyzed the statutes of limitation aforesaid as they applied to a hypothetical
case which is on all fours with the instant case. Here,
26 years after the initiation of the tax title, appellants
acquired a portion of the outstanding legal title, where
the legal owners had admittedly abandoned the property even before the initiation of the tax title, and
appellants then by a brief, cursory and unsuccessful
effort attempted to put themselves into "actual occupancy and possession" to oust the tax title claimants.
This is inimical to the intent and purpose of our limitations statutes and such efforts should, as in the past,
fail.
Respect£ ully submitted,
MARY C. LEHMER
Attorney for Respondents
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